

## *Possible intensionality of the verb phrase position*

### **Richard Zuber**

Recent research on intensionality concerns possible grammatical positions on which intensionality can arise, that is positions where substitutions *salva veritate* are not possible (Larson 2002, Szabo 2005). In this note I propose an example of intensional (complex) noun phrases. As noun phrases in subject position are functional expressions applying to verb phrases to give sentences, such constructions may give rise to intensionality regarding the verb phrase position. Possible candidates for such intensional noun phrases are complex noun phrases in which modification by *even* occurs. In order to understand this example it is important to keep in mind that *even*, which can modify all major grammatical categories, should be taken here as modifying precisely a noun phrase. Consider now example (1). It is usually assumed that its meaning is composed of three different parts: assertoric, in (2a), quantificational, in (2b) and scalar (or the surprise-like effect), in (2c):

(1) Even Leo is a dancer.

(2a) Leo is a dancer.

(2b) Someone else is a dancer.

(2c) It is surprising that Leo is a dancer.

There is no general agreement on to whether all the three parts above have the same semantic status and in particular whether (2c) should be considered as contributing to the truth-conditions of (1). Notice, however, that if (2c) does express part of the truth-conditional meaning of (1) then the noun phrase *even Leo* induces intensionality concerning the position of the verb phrase to which it applies as a subject noun phrase. Indeed, suppose that in some situation, the set of those who are dancers is the same as the set of those who are singers, and consider (3) and (4):

(3) Even Leo is a singer.

(4) It is surprising that Leo is a singer.

Obviously (1) and (3) need not have the same truth value. This is because (2c) and (4) may

differ in their truth-value.. This resistance to substitution shows that the subject noun phrase *even Leo* induces intensionality and the intensional position is the position taken by the verb phrase.

Two points to conclude. First, notice that although the intensionality above is related to the intensionality of sentential operators in (2c) or (4), where the verbs explicitly expressing surprise are present, we can not say that this form of intensionality is thus reduced to sentential intensionality. This is because (1) is not equivalent to (2c) and (3) is not equivalent to (4). Second, the intensionality just exhibited occurs in « very » simple sentences, that is sentences which do not contain modals or propositional attitude verbs, nor, in contradistinction to examples discussed in Saul (1997), do they contain sentential connectives.

CNRS

Laboratoire de Linguistique Formelle of CNRS and University of Paris 7

[Richard.Zuber@linguist.jussieu.fr](mailto:Richard.Zuber@linguist.jussieu.fr)

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